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The First Amendment Status of Commercial Speech: Why 
the FCC Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 Are Unconstitutional 
Deborah L. Hamilton 
INTRODUCTIONt 
Six weeks ago, feeling generous, you decided to make a donation 
to your local hospital. Since then, you have been besieged by calls from 
other charitable organizations seeking donations. Subsequently, you also 
decided to take advantage of a special TV offer to purchase a "unique 
collection" of your favorite songwriter's greatest hits. This, too, re-
sulted in a flood of calls from other vendors with "once-in-a-lifetime 
special offers." Tonight, during a relaxing meal at home with your fam-
ily, you are interrupted for the umpteenth time by a ringing phone. Re-
luctantly, you get up from your chair to answer the call.1 When you 
t As this issue was going to press, the Supreme Court announced its decision in 
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, No. 94-1140, 1996 WL 241709 (U.S. May 13, 
1996). An effort has been made to incorporate the decision into the body of the Note, 
and the author believes that the Note's analysis remains accurate. 
In Liquormart, the Court struck down a complete ban on the price advertising of 
liquor. The Court applied the traditional Central Hudson test for evaluating the constitu-
tionality of commercial speech regulations. 1996 WL 241709, at *12-13 (citing Central 
Hudson Gas & Blee. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557 (1980)). Several Jus-
tices, however, expressed some doubt about whether and when commercial speech 
should be treated differently than fully protected speech. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and 
Ginsburg suggested that commercial speech should receive less First Amendment pro-
tection only when the speech is regulated to preserve "a fair bargaining process." 1996 
WL 241709, at *10. Justices Scalia and Thomas suggested that perhaps commercial 
speech should not receive less protection than noncommercial speech. 1996 WL 
241709, at *18-19 (Scalia, J., concurring); 1996 WL 241709, at *21 (Thomas, J., con-
curring). Despite the doubts that the Justices expressed, the Court did not overrule Cen-
tral Hudson. Further, any commercial speech regulation that fails Central Hudson inter-
mediate scrutiny - like the regulation at issue in this Note - would not survive 
heightened scrutiny should the Court decide to apply it 
1. Nearly everyone responds to a telephone's command. One suicide jumper on 
the ledge of a building ready to plunge to his death allegedly crawled back into the 
building to answer a ringing telephone. See James A. Albert, The Constitutionality of 
Requiring Telephone Companies To Protect Their Subscribers from Telemarketing Calls, 
33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 51, 52 (1993) {citing MYRON BENTON, THE PRIVACY OF INVAD· 
ERS 176 (1984)); see also Consuelo Louda Kertz & Lisa Boardman Burnette, 
Telemarketing Tug-of-War: Balancing Telephone Information Technology and the First 
Amendment with Consumer Protection and Privacy (pt 2), 5 LoY. CONSUMER L. REP. 
104, 105 (1993) ("[Telemarketing] calls often are made at dinnertime or on the week-
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pick up the phone, you hear the hum of a recorded voice on the other 
end of the line. Even before listening to the recording, you are annoyed 
by the unwanted intrusion into the privacy of your home. But, does the 
content of the message - be it seeking a charitable donation or a com-
mercial sale - affect the type of harm the call causes? It is important 
to think about the answer to this question because the FCC regulations 
implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA)2 
prohibit commercial recorded messages while permitting other types of 
recorded messages. In order for these regulations to survive constitu-
tional scrutiny, therefore, the FCC must demonstrate that the type of 
harm a phone call causes indeed does depend on the content of the 
phone call.3 
Congress passed the TCPA in response to consumer complaints4 
with the hope that it would balance residential telephone subscribers' 
desire for privacy with telephone solicitors' right to free speech and 
consumers' right to information.5 One provision of the Act specifically 
end, times when consumers are most likely to be at home. However, these are also 
times that many people want to relax and 'escape the hurly-burly of the outside busi-
ness and political world.' " (quoting Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 
(1969) (Black, J., concurring))). 
2. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994)). 
3. The FCC itself recognized that "exempting calls made for political and charita-
ble solicitation or survey research purposes from regulations applicable to commercial 
sales calls would also appear to raise serious constitutional questions in the absence of 
significant practical differences between unsolicited commercial and noncommercial 
calls.'' See In re Unsolicited Tel. Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1035 (1980). 
4. See COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSP. COMM., AUTOMATED TELEPHONE 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, S. REP. No. 178, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1991), reprinted 
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1969 ("The growth of consumer complaints about these 
calls has two sources: the increasing number of telemarketing firms in the business of 
placing telephone calls, and the advance of technology which makes automated phone 
calls more cost-effective.''). 
The following story provides an example of the type of behavior that spawned 
complaints: A hair stylist and the owner of a man-to-man dating service in Iowa pur-
chased an autodialer, prerecorded three different messages on it, and programmed it to 
call local numbers with the Drake University prefix twenty-four hours a day. Students 
were roused out of bed in the middle of the night before exams by messages such as, 
"If I had hair as ugly as yours, I'd call Jerry Frick, hair stylist, immediately," and "Are 
you lonely and looking for someone to romp with you on your waterbed?" See Victoria 
Benning, D.M. Hair Stylist Vows To Fight Latest Legal Snag, DES MOINES REG., Apr. 7, 
1988, at 3M; Tom Carney, Phone Dialer Reaches Out and Annoys People, DES MOINES 
REG .. Jan. 15, 1988, at lM. 
5. Representative Edward Markey, the chief sponsor of the House version of the 
bill, explained, "I believe that telemarketing can be a powerful and effective business 
tool, but the nightly ritual of phone calls to the home from 'strangers' and 'robots' has 
many Americans fed up.'' Cindy Skrzycki, Lawmakers Put Nuisance Calls on Hold to 
Some Phone Lines; Consumers Must Give Prior Consent to Firms, WASH. POST, Nov. 
28, 1991, at 013. 
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addresses the technological revolution in telemarketing brought about 
by the developm~nt of autodialers and recorded-message players.6 
The no-recorded-message provision makes it unlawful for callers 
"to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an 
artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior 
express consent of the called party. " 7 An exemption provision, how-
ever, permits the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to ex-
empt from the ban those messages that do not include "unsolicited ad-
vertisements. " 8 FCC regulations implemented this exception and now 
outlaw only those recorded messages that include an unsolicited 
advertisement. 9 
Although some residential-telephone subscribers may applaud the 
congressional effort to protect their privacy, the regulations implement-
ing the no-recorded-message provision raise constitutional questions by 
singling out commercial speech for particularly strict regulation. One 
federal district court found the statutory no-recorded-message provision 
unconstitutional and granted a preliminary injunction staying enforce-
ment.10 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the statutory provision 
satisfies constitutional requirements because the statutory exemption to 
the broad ban on recorded messages is "permissive, not mandatory. It 
6. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l)(B) (1994). Hereinafter this Note refers to this provi-
sion as the "no-recorded-message provision." 
Autodialer recorded-message players (ADRMPs) vastly increase the efficiency of 
telephone solicitation because they enable computers to dial consecutive phone numbers 
and transmit a preprogrammed sales message. An autodialer dials the home-telephone 
numbers listed on the computer system and plays a recorded message; when the mes-
sage ends, the autodialer dials the next number and continues the cycle. See Albert, 
supra note 1, at 52; Kertz & Burnette, supra note 1, at 105. ADRMPs thus outpace 
human dialers, reaching - and possibly disturbing - a much larger number of 
households. 
7. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l)(B) (1994) (emphasis added). 
8. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(B)(ii)(m (1994) (emphasis added). 
9. No person may "[i]nitiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line 
using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express 
consent of the called party, unless the call is initiated for emergency purposes or is ex-
empted by § 64.1200(c) of this section." 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) (1995). ~e exemp-
tions section defines "telephone call" to exclude a call 
[t]hat is not made for a commercial purpose; [t]hat is made for a commercial pur-
pose but does not include the transmission of any unsolicited advertisement; [t]o 
any person with whom the caller has an established business relationship at the 
time the call is made; or [w]hich is a tax-exempt nonprofit organization. 
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) (1995). 
10. See Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360 (D. Or. 1993), revd., 46 F.3d 970 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995). Commentators also argued that the statutory 
provision violates the First Amendment. See, e.g., Howard E. Berkenblit, Note, Can 
Those Telemarketing Machines Keep Calling Me? - The Telephone Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 1991 After Moser v. FCC, 36 B.C. L. REV. 85 (1994). 
June 1996] Note - Regulating Commercial Speech 2355 
in no way requires the FCC to adopt such exemptions by regulations, 
order or otherwise." 11 
In its opinion upholding the statute, the Ninth Circuit specifically 
indicated that it was not passing on the FCC's implementing regula-
tions, 12 suggesting that the regulations, which clearly mandate a distinc-
tion between commercial and noncommercial messages, would present 
a different problem. The Ninth Circuit dismissed a later challenge to the 
regulations for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the challenge 
failed to meet the sixty-day time limitation for review of final agency 
orders.13 Although the regulations can no longer be challenged directly, 
a defendant can raise the constitutionality of the regulations as a de-
fense in any FCC enforcement proceeding. 
This Note considers the constitutionality of the FCC's regulations 
implementing the no-recorded-message provision of the 1991 TCPA 
and concludes that they violate the First Amendment because they im-
permissibly distinguish between commercial and noncommercial 
speech. Part I explains the structure of the FCC's recorded-message reg-
ulations and demonstrates that the regulations explicitly distinguish 
commercial recorded messages from other recorded messages. Part II 
examines First Amendment protection for commercial speech in light of 
three 1993 Supreme Court decisions14 that restructured commercial 
speech doctrine by holding that the government can single out commer-
cial speech for regulation only in response to a distinct harm arising 
from the speech. Part ill applies the modern commercial speech test to 
the FCC regulations implementing the no-recorded-message provision 
of the TCPA and concludes that the FCC regulations violate the First 
Amendment protections accorded commercial speech because they are 
not reasonably related to any distinct harm caused by commercial 
speech, nor are they narrowly tailored. 
11. Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 
(1995). 
12. See 46 F.3d at 973 ("[W]e do not review here the FCC's regulation that ex-
empts noncommercial automated calls from its ban."). 
13. See Moser v. FCC, No. 94079835 (9th Cir. May 5, 1995). Title 28, § 2344 of 
the U.S. Code, which governs judicial review of agency orders, provides that "[a]ny 
party aggrieved by the final order may, within 60 days after its entry, file a petition to 
review the order." 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1994). All of the circuits that have considered the 
question have found that this restriction constitutes a jurisdictional limit on the power of 
the courts of appeals to review agency actions. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
FCC, 773 F.2d 375, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
14. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Edenfield v. 
Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 
(1993). 
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I. THE FCC's REsTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL RECORDED MEsSAGES 
Because commercial speech receives different treatment under the 
First Amendment than fully protected speech, 15 a First Amendment 
analysis of the regulations implementing the no-recorded-message pro-
vision of the TCPA requires a determination of what type of speech the 
regulations affect. This Part examines the structure of the regulations 
implementing the TCPA and determines that the FCC explicitly distin-
guishes commercial speech from noncommercial speech. Section I.A in-
troduces the regulations. Section I.B discusses the Court's definition of 
commercial speech and concludes that the regulations implementing the 
no-recorded-message provision impose unique burdens on commercial 
speech. 
A. The Regulations Implementing the No-Recorded-Message 
Provision 
The TCPA outlaws the use of recorded messages by all telephone 
solicitors calling residences, but this restriction permits specific exemp-
tions.16 The provision provides: 
15. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-15, at 896 
(2d ed. 1988) (recognizing that commercial speech receives less protection than political 
speech). At least two Justices have suggested that it may be time to reconsider Central 
Hudson itself because they are not certain that commercial speech should be treated dif-
ferently than noncommercial speech. See 44 Liquonnart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, No. 94-
1140, 1996 WL 241709, at *19 (U.S. May 13, 1996). 
16. The TCPA also includes other provisions that deal with various aspects of tele-
phone solicitation. The major provisions of the TCPA all fit into two categories: techni-
cal requirements and restrictions limiting the pennissible uses of autodialed or recorded 
messages. 
The Act includes three primary nontechnical restrictions on the use of automated 
telephone equipment not including the no-recorded-message provision. First, the TCPA 
forbids all callers from using automatic-dialing devices or artificial and prerecorded 
messages to call emergency telephone lines, health-care facilities, and numbers assigned 
to services for which the called party is charged for calls received. See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(l)(A) (1994). This provision applies equally to all callers, thus avoiding the 
constitutional questions caused by placing exceptional burdens on one type of message. 
Second, the Act prohibits callers from sending unsolicited advertisements to telephone 
facsimile machines. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l)(C) (1994). This provision presents simi-
lar constitutional problems as the no-recorded-message regulations because it distin-
guishes between commercial messages and noncommercial messages. See Jennifer L. 
Radner, Comment, Phone, Fax, and Frustration: Electronic Commercial Speech and 
Nuisance Law, 42 EMORY LJ. 359, 379-81 (1993) (suggesting the TCPA's prohibition 
on unsolicited advertisements via facsimile violates the First Amendment). Third, the 
Act disallows the use of automatic-dialing machines if they tie up two or more lines of 
a multiline business at one time. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l)(D) (1994). Because this pro-
vision applies to all callers, it also avoids constitutional infinnities. 
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It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States to initiate 
any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or 
prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent 
of the called party, unless the call is initiated for emergency purposes or 
is exempted by rule or order by the Commission under paragraph 
(2)(B).11 
In paragraph (2)(B) Congress delegated rulemaking authority to the 
FCC to exempt only certain calls from the prohibition on recorded 
solicitations.18 
Following Congress's lead, the FCC adopted regulations that cod-
ify the congressional exceptions to the no-recorded-message provision. 
The exemptions section of the regulations defines the prohibited tele-
phone calls to exclude calls 
[t]hat [are] not made for a commercial purpose; [t]hat [are] made for a 
commercial purpose but [do] not include the transmission of any unsolic-
ited advertisement; [t]o any person with whom the caller has an estab-
The TCPA also sets out technical and procedural standards applicable to all 
telemarketing equipment. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(d) (1994). The sections of the TCPA 
governing artificial or prerecorded voice systems now require that recorded messages 
release the line after the called party hangs up the phone. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(d)(3)(B) 
(1994). This requirement should prevent callers from blocking telephone access and en-
sure that phone lines remain available for use in emergencies. 
The TCPA also demands that solicitors include certain minimum information in all 
messages so that recipients can avoid harassing phone calls. See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(d)(3)(A) (1994), Because the disconnection requirement and the minimum-
information provision apply to all recorded messages, they do not raise the constitu-
tional problems posed by the prohibition on recorded messages containing an unsolic-
ited advertisement. 
Congress developed these benchmarks in response to consumers' public-safety 
concerns about telemarketing. In an often-cited story, a recorded message almost 
caused dire consequences when it remained on the line after the recipient had hung up 
on the message. The message tied up the phone line and prevented a mother from dial-
ing out for emergency medical assistance for her child. The child survived because her 
mother ran to a neighbor's house to summon an ambulance. See, e.g., James Barron, 
'Junk' Phone Calls: Danger on the Line?, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1988, at A36. In a simi-
lar case in Michigan, an autodialer tied up the line, making it impossible for a family to 
call an ambulance when the father suffered a sudden injury. See Thom Kupper, Call for 
Regulation: Congress Targets Automated Phone Pitches, NEWSDAY, Sept. 4, 1991, at 41. 
17. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l)(B) (1994) (emphasis added). 
18. The Commission can make exceptions for calls that "do not include the trans-
mission of any unsolicited advertisement." 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (1994) (em-
phasis added); see 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (defining the term "unsolicited advertisement" 
as "any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, 
goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express 
invitation or permission"). 
The exemptions section also exempts calls that "are not made for a commercial 
purpose; and (ii) such categories or classes of calls made for a commercial purpose as 
the Commission determines (I) will not adversely affect the privacy rights that this sec-
tion is intended to protect." 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(B)(i) (1994) (emphasis added). 
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lished business relationship at the time the call[s] [are] made; or [w]hich 
is a tax-exempt nonprofit organization.19 
The regulations, when coupled with their exemptions, definitively pro-
hibit only recorded messages containing an unsolicited advertisement. 
The statutory regime underlying the regulations categorizes re-
corded calls on the basis of the information included in the message and 
subjects certain types of solicitations to more restrictive regulation.20 
Congress denied the FCC the option to exempt any calls containing an 
unsolicited advertisement from the ban on recorded messages. The FCC 
regulations quoted above perpetuate the congressional distinction be-
tween messages that contain an advertisement and those that do not. 
Differentiating a recorded unsolicited advertisement from other re-
corded messages raises First Amendment questions about the level of 
protection accorded to advertisements. 
B. The FCC Regulations as a Commercial Speech Restriction 
The regulations implementing the no-recorded-message provision, 
which prohibit calls containing an unsolicited advertisement, constitute 
a restriction on commercial speech because of their broad definition of 
"advertisement." In the First Amendment context, commercial speech 
remains a somewhat ambiguous concept.21 The Court has oscillated be-
tween different definitions of commercial speech depending on the facts 
of the case, and even the limited definitions on which the Court relies 
are rather vague. Regardless of the definition used, however, the FCC's 
restriction on unsolicited advertisements is a commercial speech 
regulation. 
In the first case to extend constitutional protection to commercial 
speech, the Court characterized commercial speech as that "which does 
'no more than propose a commercial transaction.' " 22 In later cases, the 
19. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) (1995). 
20. See 41 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2)(B) (1994). 
21. See, e.g., TRIBE. supra note 15, § 12-15, at 896 (stating that the distinction be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech "has not provided reliable guidance for 
resolution of individual cases"); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Com-
mercial Speech?, 16 VA. L. REV. 627, 648 (1990) (asserting that "[w]e have a distinc-
tion, then, with no basis in the Constitution, with no justification in the real world, and 
that must often be applied arbitrarily in any but the easiest cases"); David F. McGowan, 
Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 382-83 
(1990) (discussing the Court's failure to articulate a coherent vision of commercial 
speech). 
22. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commn. on 
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
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Court developed a more expansive notion of commercial speech, 
describing it as ".expression related solely to the economic interests of 
the speaker and its audience. " 23 The Court continues to use both defini-
tions, as well as combinations of the two,24 preferring to rely on the 
"common sense" difference between commercial and noncommercial 
speech.25 The Court recently admitted that the distinction between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech was "only a matter of degree. " 26 
The regulations implementing the TCPA, however, differentiate 
commercial speech from noncommercial speech under either definition 
because the regulations' focus on "unsolicited advertisements" meets 
even the Court's narrowest definition of commercial speech. The regu-
lations provide that any telephone call that does not include an "unso-
licited advertisement" is exempt from the ban on recorded-message 
players.27 Under the regulations, an unsolicited advertisement means 
"any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any 
property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without 
that person's prior express invitation or permission."28 Thus, the FCC 
prohibits recorded messages that propose commercial transactions -
the narrow definition of commercial speech - because such messages 
necessarily involve information about the "commercial availability or 
quality of property, goods, or services. " 29 
The regulations implementing the no-recorded-message provision 
thus draw a line between commercial speech and noncommercial 
23. Central Hudson Gas & Blee. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980) (striking down a complete ban on electric-utility advertising). In Central 
Hudson, the Court also referred to commercial speech as speech proposing a commer-
cial transaction. See 447 U.S. at 562, 563 n.5. The Court appeared to adopt the broader 
definition when it refused to extend full First Amendment protection to advertising that 
included claims related to political-social issues. 
24. Compare Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473 (1989) (describing com-
mercial speech as speech that "propose[s] a commercial transaction" (quoting Virginia 
State Bd., 425 U.S. at 762)) and Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-
68 (1983) (explaining that not all "informational" material contained in a commercial 
advertisement constitutes commercial speech) with In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 204 n.17 
(1982) (accepting Central Hudson's definition of commercial speech as expression re-
lated solely to the economic interests of the speaker and the audience). 
25. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993). 
The Court reiterated its reliance on the "commonsense distinction" between commer-
cial speech and noncommercial speech in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 
1589 (1995). 
26. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 423. 
27. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2), (c)(2) (1995). 
28. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(5) (1995). 
29. The regulations clearly countenance the broadest definition of commercial 
speech because they apply to messages related to the economic interests of the caller 
and the listener, the broadest categorization of commercial speech. 
2360 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:2352 
speech because they definitively prohibit recorded advertisements. By 
defining an adver_tisement broadly, the Act effectively forbids the FCC 
from exempting calls made for a commercial purpose under either the 
broad or narrow definition of commercial speech.30 
II. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH TEsT 
Three commercial speech cases decided in 1993 - City of Cincin-
nati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,31 Edenfield v. Fane,32 and United States 
v. Edge Broadcasting Co.33 - clarify the role of commercial speech in 
the First Amendment hierarchy. Read as a group, these cases emphasize 
that commercial speech gamers less constitutional protection than fully 
protected speech only when Congress regulates it in response to its 
unique harms. Congress cannot target commercial speech for regulation 
simply on the basis of its content. 
The Court's most recent commercial speech case, 44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode Island,34 is consistent with this understanding of the 1993 
cases. In Liquormart the Court struck down a state law on the price ad-
vertising of liquor, stating "when a State entirely prohibits the dissemi-
nation of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons un-
related to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less 
reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment 
generally demands."35 Justice Stevens's plurality opinion thus recog-
nized that all commercial speech regulations cannot be evaluated in the 
same manner. The level of scrutiny depends on the justification for and 
breadth of the regulation. 
The 1993 cases can therefore be understood as beginning the pro-
cess of bringing commercial speech doctrine into line with the Court's 
30. The regulations theoretically include a loophole for calls made for a commer-
cial purpose that do not include an unsolicited advertisement. See 47 C.F.R. 
§ 64.1200(c)(2) ("The term 'telephone call' ... shall not include a call that is made for 
a commercial purpose but does not include the transmission of any unsolicited adver-
tisement."). The loophole suggests that some messages related to the economic interests 
of the parties do not include an "unsolicited advertisement." In fact, this loophole is il-
lusory because of the expansive definition of unsolicited advertisement. Any messages 
that pertain only to the econotnic interests of the speaker and the listener will necessa-
rily include information about the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, 
or service - the definition of an unsolicited advertisement that cannot be exempted ac-
cording to the statute, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (1994), and the regulations, 47 C.F.R. 
§ 64.1200(c)(2) (1995). 
31. 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
32. 507 U.S. 761 (1993). 
33. 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
34. No. 94-1140, 1996 WL 241709 (U.S. May 13, 1996). 
35. 1996 WL 241709, at *9. 
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traditional distinction between content-based and effects-based regula-
tion. When Congress regulates speech on the basis of its general subject 
matter or on the basis of its particular viewpoint, the Court uses strict 
scrutiny to evaluate the regulation and requires both a compelling inter-
est to justify the regulation and regulatory means narrowly tailored to 
fit the ends. When Congress regulates speech on the basis of the effects 
that it produces, the Court engages in a balancing process to ensure that 
the regulation does not unduly restrict speech.36 
After recognizing that even speech that did no more than propose a 
commercial transaction warranted First Amendment protection, 37 the 
Court, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission,38 set forth the factors that lower courts should use to eval-
uate the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations. The test 
consists of four prongs, each of which must be met for a regulation to 
be found valid: (1) the commercial speech must concern lawful activity; 
(2) the government interest underlying the regulation must be substan-
tial; (3) the regulation must directly advance the interest asserted; and 
( 4) the regulation must be reasonably related to the interest asserted. 
The Court distinguished this test from the usual strict-scrutiny standard 
by suggesting that even content-based commercial speech regulations 
garnered only intermediate scrutiny rather than the strict scrutiny usu-
ally applied to content-based regulations.39 
During the 1993 Term, however, the Court's decisions in three 
commercial speech cases40 developed the doctrine such that a commer-
cial speech regulation earns intermediate scrutiny only when the gov-
ernmental purpose underlying the regulation relates to the unique secon-
dary effects of the speech. 
This Part examines the modem commercial speech test developed 
in the 1993 commercial speech cases and demonstrates that post-1993 
Supreme Court cases support the expansive protection these cases pro-
vide for commercial speech. Despite its increased protection for com-
36. TRIBE. supra note 15, at§ 12-2. Professor Tribe refers to these two approaches 
as track one and track two. Track-one regulations are presumptively unconstitutional 
while track-two regulations are presumptively constitutional. 
37. See Vrrginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vrrginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (striking down a statute that prohibited pharmacists from ad-
vertising prescription-drug prices). Interestingly, the consumer recipients of information 
brought suit in this case, not the pharmacists, clearly indicating the value of commercial 
infonnation to the public. 
38. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
39. See 447 U.S. at 562-63 & n.5. 
40. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Edenfield v. 
Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 
(1993). 
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mercial speech, the modem commercial speech test continues to require 
that commercial speech regulations meet the four criteria set out in 
Central Hudson. 41 This Part discusses the modem approach to the sub-
stantial interest, direct advancement, and reasonable relationship prongs 
of the Central Hudson test.42 
A. The Substantial-Interest Prong of the Central Hudson Test 
To justify a commercial speech regulation, Congress first must as-
sert a substantial interest deserving of protection.43 This prong of the 
Central Hudson test is less burdensome than the test applied to content-
based regulation of fully protected speech, which requires Congress to 
assert a compelling interest in order to justify a speech regulation. 44 The 
substantial interest prong of the Central Hudson test has remained un-
changed since its inception. 45 If the government demonstrates that a 
substantial interest underlies the regulation, the Court then will consider 
the relationship between the government's interest and the regulation 
under the next two prongs of the test. The Court has explained that the 
next two factors essentially amount to a consideration of the " 'fit' be-
tween the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those 
ends."46 
B. The Direct-Advancement Prong of the Central Hudson Test 
Commercial speech regulations must pass the direct-advancement 
prong of the Central Hudson test, which requires that the regulation 
41. At least some members of the Court have indicated a willingness to reconsider 
the Central Hudson test, suggesting that commercial speech should not be treated differ-
ently from fully protected speech. See supra note 15. 
42. The first prong of the Central Hudson test demands that the regulation concern 
lawful, nonmisleading speech. Because that prong is rarely at issue in commercial 
speech cases, this Note does not analyze it in depth. 
43. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
44. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 12-3, at 799 (quoting Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local 
Educators Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). The difference between a compelling interest 
and a substantial interest is elusive, but the Court simply uses the two terms to suggest 
that it will give more deference to the legislature in the case of a substantial interest 
than in the case of a compelling interest. 
45. Compare Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (asserting that the "State must as-
sert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech") with 
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1590 (1995) (arguing that "our analysis 
focuses on the substantiality of the interest behind [the statute at issue]") and Ibanez v. 
Florida Dept. of Bus. & Prof. Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084, 2088-89 (1994) (citing In re 
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (asserting that the "state can regulate commercial 
speech if it shows that it has a 'substantial interest' ")). 
46. Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1591 (quoting Posada de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 
U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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"directly and materially advances" the state interest.47 The direct-ad-
vancement requirement also has remained relatively consistent since the 
inception of the commercial speech test. In Central Hudson, the Court 
declared that "the restriction must directly advance the state interest in-
volved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffec-
tive or remote support for the government's purpose. " 48 This prong de-
mands that the government demonstrate the relationship between its 
goal and the challenged regulation by examining the effectiveness of 
the regulation. In 1995, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to this 
standard, requiring the government to produce actual evidence and not 
mere "speculation or conjecture" that its regulation directly and materi-
ally advances its goals.49 The final prong of the Central Hudson test' 
considers the reasonableness of the regulation by examining the scope 
of the regulation.50 
C. The Reasonable-Relationship Prong of the Central Hudson Test 
The 1993 Supreme Court commercial speech cases clarified the 
reasonable-relationship prong of the Central Hudson test for commer-
cial speech regulations. They require that a statute survive a two-step 
analysis to meet the reasonable-relationship prong. First, as discussed in 
section II.C.l, the government must justify the statute by identifying a 
distinct harm arising specifically from the regulated speech. The legisla-
ture cannot single out commercial speech for stricter regulation simply 
47. See Ibanez, 114 S. Ct at 2088. 
48. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. The Court described the direct-advancement 
standard similarly in 1993, saying, "[a] governmental body seeking to sustain a restric-
tion on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that 
its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree." Edenfield v. Fane, 507 
U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993). In a 1994 case describing the direct-advancement standard, 
the Court said, "[A] regulation will not be sustained if it 'provides only ineffective or 
remote support for the government's purpose.' " Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2088-89 (quoting 
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566). 
49. See Rubin, 115 S. Ct at 1592 (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770 (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). In Rubin the Court said that the direct advancement require-
ment could not be satisfied by "anecdotal evidence" and "educated guesses." 115 S. 
Ct. at 1593. In Edenfield, the Court suggested that "anecdotal evidence" might be 
enough to meet the direct advancement requirement It also indicated that it would look 
at studies and literature on the relationship between the regulation and its goal. See 
Edenfield, 501 U.S. at 771-73. 
50. It can be difficult to tell the difference between the direct-advancement prong 
and the reasonable-relationship prong, but each reflects a different aspect of the rela-
tionship between the regulation and the government interest underlying the regulation. 
The direct-advancement prong considers the effectiveness of the regulations without 
comparing it with other alternatives. The reasonable-relationship prong considers the ef-
fect of the regulation in light of the scope of the problem and the possible alternatives. 
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because it believes commercial information holds less value than other 
types of speech .. Second, as discussed in section II.C.2, the statute's 
scope must be in proportion to the government interest it serves. The 
1993 cases reassert that intermediate scrutiny applies to this aspect of 
the reasonable-relationship requirement. 
1. The Unique-Harm Requirement 
The unique-harm requirement elucidated in the 1993 commercial 
speech cases, which demands that commercial speech regulations ad-
dress the unique impact of commercial speech, creates three tiers of 
protection for commercial speech. The lowest level of protection, ra-
tional-basis scrutiny, applies to regulation of false commercial speech.51 
An intermediate level of protection, intermediate scrutiny, applies to 
commercial speech regulation that can be justified based on a distinct 
harm arising from the speech. The greatest protection, strict scrutiny,52 
applies to commercial speech regulations that cannot be justified based 
on a distinct harm arising from the speech.53 
The Court created a test that considers unique harmful effects as 
the touchstone for the constitutionality of regulations that single out 
commercial speech in the first commercial speech case of the 1993 
Term, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, lnc.54 In that case, com-
mercial publishers sued the City of Cincinnati to prevent enforcement 
of an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of commercial handbills. 
Cincinnati had used the ordinance to remove newsracks containing 
commercial newspapers from the city's sidewalks, claiming that the 
newsracks interfered with its safety and aesthetic goals. The city argued 
51. See Central Hudson, 441 U.S. at 563-64; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) ("Untruthful 
speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake."). 
52. This test is the same as that applied to content-based regulations. See TRIBE, 
supra note 15, § 12-13, at 798-99 (discussing the level of scrutiny applied to content-
based regulations). 
53. The unique commercial harm test thus should serve as a predicate to the 
Central Hudson test. The Court, however, has not adopted this methodology outright 
but rather has treated the unique harm test as an element of the Central Hudson reason-
able-relationship requirement. In its most recent commercial speech case, 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, No. 94-1140, 1996 WL 241709 (U.S. May 13, 1996), 
the Court indicated that it may be taking steps toward using this structure as a predicate 
rather than incorporating it into the Central Hudson test as the Court did in Discovery 
Network. In Liquormart, the Court held that "special care" should attend the review of 
"regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech 
related policy." 1996 WL 241709, at *9. The Court noted that the level of scrutiny a 
commercial speech regulation receives does depend on the justification for and breadth 
of the regulation. 
54. See 501 U.S. 410 (1993). 
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that it could remove commercial newsracks but not noncommercial 
newsracks posing_ identical safety and aesthetic problems because of the 
lower value of commercial speech.ss The Court rejected this "lower-
value" argument, stating that the commercial speech doctrine provides 
that commercial speech can be regulated to prevent commercial harms 
but not merely because it possesses an inherently lower value than non-
commercial speech. S6 
The unique-harm test the Court adopted is similar to the 
government-purpose-secondary-effects test developed in City of Renton 
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.s1 Taken together, Discovery Network and 
Renton indicate that the Court will allow more restrictive speech regula-
tion when the speech's secondary effects raise issues of particular pub-
lic concern.ss Renton is a time, place, and manner case - meaning a 
case in which the government regulated the mode of communication but 
not the content of the message - in which the Court declined to apply 
strict scrutinys9 to a zoning regulation applicable to adult theaters. In 
that case, the Court treated the regulation as ·content-neutral, and there-
fore deserving of intermediate scrutiny, even though it affected only 
theaters showing certain types of productions. Intermediate scrutiny ap-
plied because the municipality justified the ordinance as aimed at the 
secondary effects of the films.60 The Court examined the government's 
55. 
The major premise supporting the city's argument is the proposition that commer-
cial speech has only a low value. Based on that premise, the city contends that 
the fact that assertedly more valuable publications are allowed to use newsracks 
does not undermine its judgment that its aesthetic and safety interests are stronger 
than the interest in allowing commercial speakers to have similar access to the 
reading public. 
507 U.S. at 418-19. 
56. See 507 U.S. at 426 (concluding that "Cincinnati has not asserted an interest 
in preventing commercial harms by regulating the information distributed by respondent 
publishers' newsracks, which is, of course, the typical reason why commer:cial speech 
can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech"). 
57. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
58. The Court compared the theaters in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 
U.S. 41 (1986), with the newsracks in Discovery Network, saying that, "[i]n contrast to 
the speech at issue in Renton, there are no secondary effects attributable to respondent 
publishers' newsracks that distinguish them from the newsracks Cincinnati permits to 
remain on its sidewalks." Discovery Network, 501 U.S. at 430 (analyzing Renton). 
59. In the past, the Court applied strict scrutiny to statutes affecting speech in a 
content-discriminatory manner. The Court traditionally looked at the face of a statute 
and its application to see if the legislature differentiated speech based on content. See 
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335-36 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment). 
60. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48 (stating that "the Renton ordinance is aimed not 
at the content of the films shown at 'adult motion picture theatres,' but rather at the sec-
ondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community"). 
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objective rather than the law's application or its language to determine 
if the law should _be classified as content-neutral. 
In Discovery Network, the Court in fact claimed not to decide 
whether a regulation directed at a government interest beyond the con-
tent of commercial speech or its particular adverse effects receives the 
same strict scrutiny as a regulation applicable to fully protected speech. 
The Court instead found that Cincinnati's antihandbill regulation failed 
even the intermediate-level means-ends analysis of the Central Hudson 
test.61 Despite the lower courts' confusion,62 the Court's reasoning in 
Discovery Network demonstrates that a commercial speech regulation 
61. 
For if commercial speech is entitled to 'lesser protection' only when the regula-
tion is aimed at either the content of the speech or the particular adverse effects 
stemming from that content, it would seem to follow that a regulation that is not 
so directed should be evaluated under the standards applicable to regulations on 
fully protected speech, not the more lenient standards by which we judge regula-
tions on commercial speech. Because we conclude that Cincinnati's ban on com-
mercial newsracks cannot withstand [intermediate scrutiny], we need not decide 
whether that policy should be subject to more exacting review. 
Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416 n.11. 
Based on this language, at least one district court has suggested that a statute regu-
lating commercial speech not " 'aimed at the content of the speech or the particular ad-
verse effects stemming from that content,' probably should be scrutinized under the cri-
teria applicable to protection of fully protected speech." Kentucky Div., Horsemen's 
Benevolent & Protective Assn. v. Turfway Park Racing, 832 F. Supp. 1097, 1101-02 n.7 
(E.D. Ky. 1993) (quoting Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416 n.11), revd., 20 F.3d 1406 
(6th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original)). That court, however, like the Supreme Court in 
Discovery Network, determined that the statute at issue in the case failed even the 
means-ends analysis of the intermediate scrutiny test, so the court did not have to rely 
on the higher level test See Kentucky Division, 832 F. Supp. at 1102 ("Whatever stan-
dard is used, however, the statute cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny."). No court 
has been confronted yet with a statute that limits commercial speech for reasons unre-
lated to its content or the unique effects resulting from it that survives Central Hudson 
scrutiny but fails strict scrutiny. Although the Kentucky Division opinion suggests this 
possibility remains, the reasonable-relationship test developed in Discovery Network and 
Edenfield in fact precludes this scenario because it requires unique secondary effects. 
62. One court summarized the level of protection provided to commercial speech 
after Discovery Network by asserting that "the Supreme Court ... accords [commercial 
speech] a high value unless it is false or misleading or causes distinctive adverse effects 
which directly flow from the commercial speech regulated." Hornell Brewing Co. v. 
Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
Another court simply admitted that it was confused about how to analyze a con-
tent-based restriction on commercial advertising: 
[U]ntil very recently it would have been clear that the appropriate test was the 
four-part intermediate scrutiny analysis laid out by the Supreme Court in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission. More recent cases, 
however, have questioned the continued vitality of Central Hudson as it applies 
to content-based restrictions on commercial speech. Our resolution of this case 
renders it unnecessary to decide which standard applies, but we note the exis-
tence of the debate to inform counsel and future panels. 
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earns intermediate scrutiny only when the government regulates com-
mercial speech in. response to its distinct harms. 
In Edenfield v. Fane,63 the second commercial speech case of the 
1993 Term, the Court again emphasized the unique-harm test. The 
Court explained that the government must link commercial speech regu-
lations to its interest in protecting consumers and commerce.64 The 
state's power to regulate commercial transactions gives the state its 
power to regulate commercial expression.65 This reasoning reaffirms the 
Court's decision in Discovery Network: the state cannot justify a com-
mercial speech regulation merely by claiming that commercial speech 
deserves less protection than noncommercial speech.66 
Although the final commercial speech case decided in 1993, 
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,61 at first seems a surprising 
blow to commercial speech protection, it is in fact consistent with 
Discovery Network and Edenfield. The Court upheld a regulation out-
lawing radio broadcasts of lottery advertising by stations located in 
nonlottery states and stated that the Constitution offers less protection to 
commercial speech than to noncommercial speech. 68 
MD II Entertainment, fuc., v. City of Dallas, 28 F.3d 492, 495 (5th Cir. 1994) (footnote 
omitted); see also supra note 61. 
63. 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (rejecting Florida's ban on in-person solicitation by certi-
fied public accountants because the Court determined that the law threatened consum-
ers' interest in acquiring complete and accurate information). 
64. See 501 U.S. at 767 ("[T]he State's interest in regulating the underlying trans-
action may give it a concomitant interest in the expression itself. For this reason, laws 
restricting commercial speech unlike laws burdening other forms of expression, need 
only be tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substantial state interest in order to 
survive First Amendment scrutiny.") (citation omitted). 
65. Justice Blackmun consistently argued that only the governmental interest in 
protecting consumers from fraudulent, misleading, or coercive sales techniques justifies 
restrictive regulation of commercial speech. See, e.g., Discovery Network, 501 U.S. 410, 
438 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public 
Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Justice Blackmun did not join the majority opinion in Edenfield because he thought the 
case did not go far enough in asserting that fraud, duress, and unlawful activity provide 
the only justifications for regulating commercial speech. He limited the state's interest 
in commercial transactions to these situations. See Edenfield, 501 U.S. at 777-78 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
66. After Discovery Network and Edenfield, some Court observers determined that 
the boundary between commercial speech and noncommercial speech appeared to be 
disintegrating because the Court's decisions acknowledged the high value of commer-
cial speech. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle et al., Court: Commercial Speech Deserves Protec-
tion, NATL. LJ., Apr. 5, 1993, at 5. 
67. 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
68. See 509 U.S. at 426 (" 'Our decisions, however, have recognized the 'com-
mon-sense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which oc-
curs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of 
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Edge does not explicitly or implicitly reject the unique-
commercial-harm test enunciated in Discovery Network and Edenfield.69 
The logic of the case indicates that the Court emphasized the lower 
value of commercial speech in Edge because of the particular activity 
underlying the speech: the sale of lottery tickets in nonlottery states.70 
The state's interest in commercial transactions, particularly involving 
lottery tickets moving across state lines, justifies its involvement in 
speech about the sale of lottery tickets. The Court's anticommercial 
speech statements must be understood in the context of the case; an-
tilottery statutes command a long history of judicial support.71 The gov-
ernment and the judiciary have expressed particular concern about the 
harmful effects of the sale of lottery tickets in a federalist system in 
which some states support lotteries and others oppose them.72 
Even under Discovery Network, commercial speech receives less 
constitutional protection when the government has an interest in the 
commercial transaction underlying commercial speech.73 Edge protects 
such an interest - the government's compelling interest in regulating 
the sale of lottery tickets.74 
speech.' The Constitution therefore affords a lesser protection to commercial speech 
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.") (citation omitted). 
69. Some commentators argue that commercial speech law remains "in flux" after 
the 1993 cases. See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich et al., The Supreme Court in Transition: 
Consensus Building or Ducking the Issues and Other Developments in Urban, State and 
Local Government Law, 25 URB. LAW. 697, 715 (1993). But see Peter J. Tarsney, Note, 
Regulation of Environmental Marketing: Reassessing the Supreme Court's Protection of 
Commercial Speech, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 533 (1994) (discussing the 1993 commer-
cial speech cases and coming to similar conclusions as this Note). 
70. 509 U.S. at 429-30. 
71. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding an 1895 Act of 
Congress forbidding the transport of lottery materials in interstate or foreign com-
merce); In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a 
federal law forbidding the advertisement of lotteries in newspapers); Ex parte Jackson, 
96 U.S. 727 (1878) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a federal law prohibiting 
the use of the mail for any letter concerning lotteries). 
72. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1591 (1995) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in judgment) (emphasizing the unique concerns at issue in Edge and stat-
ing that "[u]nlike the situation in Edge Broadcasting, the policies of some States do not 
prevent neighboring States from pursuing their own alcohol-related policies within their 
respective borders"). 
73. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993) 
(explaining that commercial speech is subject to greater regulation to prevent commer-
cial harm). 
74. The Court's commercial speech cases since 1993 have not developed the 
reasonable-relationship concept more explicitly. In the first 1995 case, Rubin, the Court 
did not reach the reasonable-relationship problem because the Court decided that the 
statute at issue failed the third prong of the test, the direct-advancement requirement. 
See Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1592. In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Stevens ar-
gued that the commercial speech doctrine should be restricted to cases in which the 
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2. Do the Means Fit the Ends? 
The reasonable-relationship prong also requires that the legislature 
adopt means tailored to the ends served by the regulation. The 1993 
cases definitively assert that intermediate scrutiny governs this means-
ends analysis.75 
In Discovery Network, the Court emphasized that it takes seriously 
the requirement that the legislature have "carefully calculated" the 
means-ends fit to ensure that the regulation burdens no more speech 
than necessary.76 The Court evaluated the city's other options to reduce 
government's justification for regulation is "tailored to the special character of commer-
cial speech." 115 S. Ct at 1594. Justice Stevens criticized Central Hudson because its 
"four-part test is not related to the reasons for allowing more regulation of commercial 
speech than other speech." 115 S. Ct. at 1595. Justice Stevens's opinion ignores the 
Court's recent development of the Central Hudson doctrine, which takes account of ex-
actly his concerns. 
The second 1995 case, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995), 
also did not address the question because the Florida Bar rules at issue applied to com-
mercial solicitation by lawyers within thirty days after an accident, and they were de-
signed to respond to the harm arising from aggressive commercial solicitation. 
75. Until the 1993 cases, the level of deference accorded to the legislature's judg-
ment that the regulation burdened no more speech than necessary had been unclear. In 
two earlier cases, a majority of the Court accepted Congress's judgment that a regula-
tion was reasonably related to the government's interest without requiring the state to 
produce evidence. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478-81 (1989) (majority 
claiming that it was "loath to second guess the Government's judgment"); Posada de 
P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 343-44 (1986) (applying a level of scrutiny 
similar to that of the rational-basis test in considering whether the means was reasona-
bly related to the ends and concluding "that it is up to the legislature to decide whether 
or not such a 'counterspeech' policy would be as effective in reducing the demand for 
casino gambling as a restriction on advertising"). In Posada, Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissented because he believed that the Court abdicated 
its responsibility by failing to evaluate alternative methods and simply deferring to the 
legislature's judgment. See 478 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the 
government [must] prove that more limited means are not sufficient to protect its inter-
ests, [it is] for a court to decide whether or not the government has sustained this 
burden"). 
These cases used a standard akin to the rational-basis test. Under the rational-basis 
test, the Court does not require the government to produce any evidence that the regula-
tion actually furthers its interest. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 
(1955). This standard was used despite the fact that Central Hudson mandates more 
than a rational relationship. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 570 (1980) (rejecting the Commission's argument that a com-
plete ban on promotional advertising by an electric utility is no more extensive than 
necessary to further New York's interest in energy conservation: "[N]o showing has 
been made that a more limited restriction on the content of promotional advertising 
would not serve adequately the State's interests"). 
76. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993) 
(reasoning that "[t]he fact that the city failed to address its recently developed concern 
about newsracks by regulating their size, shape, appearance, or number indicates that it 
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newsrack blight and determined that the city failed to adopt several less 
restrictive means 9f dealing with its safety and aesthetic concerns.77 The 
majority reiterated the Court's rejection of the rational-basis test, im-
plicitly repudiating the analysis in earlier cases that conflicted with 
Central Hudson.18 
In Edenfield, the Court repeated its commitment to the intermedi-
ate standard of review of the means-ends analysis of commercial speech 
regulations.79 Although the Court did not reach the question of reasona-
ble fit under the Central Hudson test, it reached the same question 
under the time, place, and manner test. The Court often relies on lan-
guage explicating the narrowly drawn prong of the time, place, and 
manner test when it considers reasonable fit under Central Hudson,· the 
Court treats the two tests as highly analogous. 80 In Edenfield, the Court 
determined that a time, place, and manner restriction is reasonable only 
when the restriction on speech shares a "close and substantial relation" 
with the government interest asserted.81 This stands in contrast to the ra-
tional-basis test, which requires only that it be conceivable that the reg-
ulation could further the government's interest. 82 
In Edge, the Court appeared to reverse its approach by suggesting 
that it once again would rely on a rational-basis test. The Court ex-
plained that a regulation meets the reasonable-relationship test if the 
"regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be 
achieved less effectively absent the regulation. " 83 The federal govern-
ment's prohibition on lottery advertising reasonably related to its inter-
est in ensuring that both lottery and nonlottery states could pursue their 
policies "even if ... there were only marginal advancement of that in-
terest. "84 This language is clearly inconsistent with the Court's ap-
proach in Discovery Network and Edenfield. The Court went on, how-
has not 'carefully calculated' the costs and benefits associated with burden on speech 
imposed by its prohibition" (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480)). 
77. See 507 U.S. at 417. 
78. See 507 U.S. at 417 n.13 (stating that "[s]o too have we rejected mere 
rational-basis review"). The Court tried to reconcile its analysis with the earlier cases, 
but, as commentators have noted, Discovery Network signals a new, more in-depth anal-
ysis of the means-ends fit See, e.g., Robert T. Cahill, Jr., Casenote, City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc.: Towards Heightened Scrutiny for Truthful Commercial 
Speech, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 225, 245-46 (1994). ' 
79. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 701, 773 (1993). 
80. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 429 (1993); 
Fox, 492 U.S. at 477. 
81. See Edenfield, 501 U.S. at 773. 
82. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). 
83. Edge, 509 U.S. at 430 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 
799 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
84. See 509 U.S. at 429. 
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ever, to demonstrate that the regulation more than marginally advanced 
the federal goveqnnent's policy.85 The Court analyzed the means-ends 
fit consistently with the intermediate-scrutiny requirements of Central 
Hudson in spite of its language to the contrary. Further, the precedential 
value of Edge remains debatable because of the government's special 
interest in regulating lotteries and protecting federalist values by al-
lowing lottery and nonlottery states to pursue· their policies. 
Despite Edge, the Court reiterated its repudiation of the· rational-
basis test in 1995.86 The Court relied on Discovery Network, saying that 
it did not equate the reasonable-relationship test "with the less rigorous 
obstacles of rational basis review. " 87 As a whole, Supreme Court prece- · 
dent since 1993 demonstrates that intermediate scrutiny must be applied 
to the means-ends fit in commercial speech cases. Even if the Govern- · 
ment can show that a regulation addresses the unique harms of com-
mercial speech, to meet the reasonable relationship prong, it must also 
show that the regulation bears a close relationship to the end and does 
not burden substantially more speech than necessary. 
ill. APPLYING THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH TEsT TO THE REGULATIONS 
IMPLEMENTING THE TCPA 
This Part applies the modern commercial speech test to the FCC 
regulations implementing the no-recorded-message provision_ of the 
TCPA and concludes that they violate the First Amendment because 
they distinguish commercial speech from noncommercial speech with:. 
out reference to the unique harms of the commercial speech. Section 
ill.A examines the government interest underlying the FCC regulations 
and determines that it survives scrutiny under the Central Hudson test. 
Section ill.B demonstrates that it is unclear whether the regulation sat-
isfies the direct-advancement test. Section ill.C concludes that the regu-
lations fail the reasonable-relationship prong of the Central Hudson test, 
and therefore are unconstitutional. 
85. Edge, 509 U.S. at 432 ("[A]pplying the statutory restriction to Edge would di-
rectly serve the statutory purpose of North Carolina's antigambling policy by excluding 
invitations to gamble from 11 % of the radio listening time in the nine-county area. 
Without more, this result could hardly be called either 'ineffective,' 'remote,' or 
'conditional'."). 
86. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct 2371, (1995). 
87. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380. 
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A. The FCC Regulations and the Substantial-Interest Prong of the 
Central Hudson Test 
Congress justifies the no-recorded-message provision of the TCPA 
by asserting its interest in protecting residential privacy. 88 This interest 
meets the requirements .of the substantial-interest prong of the Central 
Hudson test89 because the Supreme Court has recognized the preserva-
tion of privacy as a valid governmental objective.90 
Generally, the strength of the privacy interest deserving of protec-
tion depends on the nature of the communication and its forum; citizens 
enjoy the greatest right to privacy at home.91 Further, the Court agrees 
that aural communications may be more intrusive than visual ones be-
cause it is more difficult to block them out. Aural invasions therefore 
justify more restrictive regulation of free expression.92 Thus, the funda-
mental problem with the regulations implementing the TCPA lies not 
with their stated justification but with the method by which they seek to 
protect privacy.93 
88. See S. REP. No. 178, supra note 4, at 3, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1970. 
89. The first prong of the Central Hudson test demands that the regulation concern 
lawful, nonmisleading speech. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see also supra note 42. The no-recorded-message 
provision applies to lawful, nonmisleading commercial speech, so the provision easily 
meets the first prong of the test. 
90. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U.S. 77 (1949). The Court has specifically acknowledged that the protection of potential 
consumers' privacy against invasions by overly aggressive solicitors constitutes a legiti-
mate state goal. "Even solicitation that is neither fraudulent nor deceptive may be 
pressed with such frequency or vehemence as to intimidate, vex, or harass the recipi-
ent." Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993). The case referred to commercial so-
licitation, but there is no reason to believe that the state would not also have an interest 
in protecting citizens from intimidating, vexing, or harassing noncommercial 
solicitation. 
91. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (stating that "in the pri-
vacy of the home ... the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First 
Amendment rights of an intruder" (citing Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 
397 U.S. 728 (1970))); see also Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376 (asserting that "[t]he 
State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquillity, and privacy of the home is cer-
tainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society" (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 
U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (internal qu')tation marks omitted))); Kertz & Burnette, supra note 
1, at 104. 
92. See Kovacs, 336 U.S at 86-87 (Reed, J., plurality opinion). 
93. It could be argued that these regulations are similar to the statute at issue in 
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1979). In Carey, the Court considered the constitutional-
ity of a statute that prohibited residential picketing on privacy grounds but exempted la-
bor picketing of places of employment. The Court determined that the exemption for la-
bor picketing defeated the state's claimed interest in residential privacy. See 447 U.S. at 
465; see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2043-44 (1994) (finding that ex-
emptions in an ordinance diminished the credibility of the government's rationale for re-
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B. The FCC Regulations and the Direct-Advancement Prong of the 
Central Hudson Test 
The direct-advancement prong of the test requires a clear goal and 
an established relationship between the goal and the regulation.94 It is 
unclear whether the FCC regulations satisfy this prong because it is un-
clear what type of invasion of privacy motivated Congress. 
The legislative history of the TCPA suggests that two goals under-
lie the no-recorded-message provision and the FCC exemptions. First, 
Congress designed the provision to deal with the invasion of residential 
privacy caused by unexpected, unwanted telemarketing calls generally. 
If Congress wanted to deal with the invasion of privacy caused by all 
telemarketing calls - recorded or live - the results of this regulation 
are indeterminate because it is unclear how many calls the regulation 
eliminates.95 Second, Congress intended to address the invasion result-
ing only from recorded solicitations. 96 If Congress claims an interest 
only in preventing invasive telephone calls from recorded messages, the 
regulation can withstand the direct-advancement prong of the Central 
Hudson test because the provision eliminates a substantial number of 
recorded-message calls. 
The TCPA may or may not directly advance its objective if the 
goal of the Act is to reduce generally the number of phone solicitations 
to which Americans are subjected. The findings included in the Act es-
timate that more than 300,000 solicitors call more than eighteen million 
Americans every day.97 In the legislative history, Congress found that 
autodialer recorded message players and autodialer announcing devices 
allow 180,000 solicitors to call more than seven million Americans 
every day.98 If the no-recorded-message provision succeeded in reducing 
the total number of calls by 39% - seven million out of the total eigh-
teen million - the Court likely would conclude that the regulation di-
stricting speech). Because this argument is intimately related to the direct-advancement 
prong of the test, in which the government must show the strength of relationship be-
tween its justification and the regulation, this Note does not consider it separately. 
94. See supra section II.B. 
95. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. 
96. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
97. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 note (1994) 
(Congressional Statement of Findings). 
98. See S. REP. No. 178, supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1970. Not all the language in the Senate Report is consistent with this broad claim. At 
times, Congress seemed to suggest that the Act would have a minimal effect. The stat-
ute "may have a minimal economic impact on the telemarketing industry" because 
"most telemarketers do not place unsolicited telephone calls to residential customers us-
ing artificial or prerecorded messages." Id. at 8, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1976. 
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rectly advanced its goal of protecting privacy.99 One court evaluating 
the provision, however, found that recorded solicitations of the type 
banned by the TCPA constitute only three percent of the telemarketing 
calls received by Americans.100 A three percent reduction in the total 
number of calls cannot be considered a material advancement in privacy 
sufficient to justify a presumptive ban on recorded commercial 
messages.101 
Alternatively, the regulations promulgated under the TCPA may be 
considered a direct advancement of privacy if the goal of the Act is spe-
cifically to alleviate the banns caused by recorded solicitations.102 Con-
gress explained that it differentiated recorded speech from live speech 
because recorded messages constitute a greater invasion of privacy than 
calls made by live persons.103 Congress provides only one justification 
possibly related to privacy for its distinction: "These automated calls 
cannot interact with the customer except in preprogrammed ways [and] 
99. The Court has not indicated exactly what evidence satisfies the direct-
advancement standard. The Court frequently says regulations that "directly advance" 
the government's interest meet the standard, while those that provide only "ineffective 
or remote" support fail the test. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993), 
construed in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1591 (1995). The Court has 
indicated that "studies" could provide the basis for a judgment that a regulation materi-
ally advances privacy. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771. In Central Hudson, the Court 
suggested that the direct-advancement requirement was satisfied by a "direct link" be-
tween the regulation and the government interest. See Central Hudson Gas & Blee. 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980). Considering these terms, if 
the TCPA really generates a 39% decrease in the number of telephone calls, it would 
appear to meet the direct-advancement standard. 
100. See Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 974 n.4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 
2615 (1995) (citing both statistics from the district court estimating that 3% of all solic-
itations are taped and statistics from the FCC indicating that 17% to 30% of all solicita-
tions are automated). Relying on a separate expert, the district court in New Jersey also 
found that recorded messages constitute 3% of all telemarketing calls. See Lysaght v. 
New Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646, 651 (D.N.J. 1993). 
101. In Discovery Network, the Court held that the removal of 62 out of 2000 
newsracks - approximately 3% - could not be considered to advance materially the 
state's goal. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417-18 
(1993). 
102. The Ninth Circuit appeared to accept this justification in its opinion uphold-
ing the statute on other grounds. The court said, "We conclude that Congress accurately 
identified automated telemarketing calls as a threat to privacy." Moser, 46 F.3d at 974. 
103. See S. REP. No. 178, supra note 4, at 4, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1972 (arguing that "[i]n addition, it is clear that automated telephone calls that deliver 
an artificial or prerecorded voice message are more of a nuisance and a greater invasion 
of privacy than calls placed by 'live' persons"). Not all of the legislative history sup-
ports this result. A House report that includes a survey from Bell Atlantic indicates that 
when consumers were asked about annoyance calls, 35% to 49% mentioned 
"sales/solicitation" calls while only 13% to 21 % mentioned "computer advertising" 
calls. See H.R. REP. No. 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1991). 
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do not allow the caller to feel the frustration of the called party." 104 
Congress does not make clear exactly how this frustration justification 
relates to residential privacy, 105 but First Amendment jurisprudence gen-
erally permits the legislature to make this type of judgment about the 
time, place, and manner of speech.106 The government could single out 
recorded messages based on concerns about the manner of speech, 
rather than the content. Adopting this rationale, one state supreme court 
determined that the quality of intrusion from recorded speech differs 
from nonrecorded speech though the degree of invasion from both types 
of calls is the same. 107 Assuming recorded messages uniquely invade 
privacy, limiting commercial recorded messages directly advances the 
governmental goal of protecting privacy because it decreases the num-
ber of calls from recorded messages.108 Congress, however, provides no 
104. See S. REP. No. 178, supra note 4, at 4, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1972. 
Congress relied on testimony from Steve Hamm, Administrator of the South Carolina 
Department of Consumer Affairs, who testified that 
one of the constant refrains I hear ... from consumers and business leaders who 
have gotten these kinds of computerized calls is they wish they had the ability to 
slam the telephone down on a live human being so that the organization would 
actually understand how angry and frustrated these kinds of calls make citizens 
and slamming down a phone on a computer just does not have the same sense of 
release. 
Id. at 4 n.3, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1972 n.4 (quoting Hearings on S. 14/0, S. 
1462, and S. 857 Before Subcomm. on Communications, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 
(1991)). 
105. The fact that the relationship between consumer frustration and privacy is not 
clear may also present a problem for the FCC. According to Edenfield, a court evaluat-
ing a commercial speech regulation is required to "identify with care the interests [Con-
gress] itself asserts" and is not "permit[ted] to supplant the precise interests put for-
ward by [Congress] with other suppositions." Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 
(1993) (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). The FCC will have 
to show that frustration indeed relates to privacy. 
106. This argument suggests that different kinds of invasions of privacy occur af-
ter a consumer picks up the telephone. Although Congress can determine that recorded 
messages are more invasive of privacy because of how they occur, Congress cannot de-
termine that commercial messages are more intrusive unless it makes an argument that 
is not based on the value of the speech. The First Amendment permits Congress to 
make regulations based on the content of speech only if they survive strict scrutiny. See 
supra section II.C.1. Congress, however, can restrict the manner of speech under the in-
termediate-scrutiny time, place, and manner test as long as the regulation is not directed 
at its communicative impact See TRIBE. supra note 15, § 12-2. 
107. See State v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Minn. 1992) 
(stating that "[t]he quality of intrusion by commercial telephone solicitation initiated by 
a live operator differs from that of an ADAD generated call although the degree to 
which privacy is invaded by an particular call may be the same"), cert. denied, 507 
U.S. 1006 (1993). 
108. The Ninth Circuit appeared to accept this line of argument in its opinion up-
holding the statute on other grounds. See Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
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justification for singling out one type of recorded message, rrusmg 
problems at the r~asonable-relationship stage of the test. 
The regulations' effectiveness remains indeterminate because the 
government's vision of how they relate to residential privacy lacks clar-
ity. If Congress sought to address the invasion of privacy that results 
from all unsolicited calls - recorded or live - the impact of the provi-
sion depends on the number of calls it eliminates, which is in dispute. If 
Congress wanted to protect residents only from recorded calls, the pro-
vision would probably pass the direct-advancement test. In either case 
the success of the provision depends on its relationship to the govern-
mental goal underlying the regulation. Even if Congress clarified its 
goal and provided evidence that the regulation furthered this goal, the 
regulation would still have to pass the reasonable relationship prong of 
Central Hudson. 
C. The FCC Regulations and the Reasonable-Relationship Prong of 
the Central Hudson Test 
The FCC regulations banning the use of recorded advertisements 
contravene both parts of the reasonable-relationship test as elucidated in 
the 1993 cases. Commercial messages do not generate unique commer-
cial harms, and the means - a presumptive ban on commercial re-
corded messages - do not bear a reasonable relationship to the end of 
protecting residential privacy. 
1. The FCC Regulations and the Unique-Harm Requirement 
Discovery Network precludes the FCC from singling out commer-
cial speech for regulation simply because it believes that commercial 
speech deserves less protection: 109 the FCC must demonstrate that com-
mercial recorded messages cause unique harms that justify their curtail-
ment while noncommercial solicitors continue to enjoy unrestricted ac-
cess to residential-telephone subscribers. If all recorded messages cause 
a similar invasion of privacy, the FCC cannot single out some messages 
for regulation on the basis of content.110 Neither the FCC regulations 
nor the legislative history of the Act, however, demonstrate that com-
mercial solicitations uniquely invade privacy. The legislative history of 
the TCPA and its fmdings state that Congress designed the Act to re-
nied, 115 S. Ct 2615 (1995). The Court said, "Congress could regulate a portion of 
[automated telemarketing calls] without banning all of them." 46 F.3d at 974. 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62. 
110. This is the lesson of Discovery Network. See supra text accompanying notes 
54-62. 
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spond to consumers' demand for protection of residential privacy.111 To 
satisfy the unique-commercial-harm test, the FCC must demonstrate 
that recorded commercial advertisements cause problems different from 
the problems caused by other recorded messages. 
Congress suggests three content-related justifications for regulating 
commercial messages. Ultimately, none of the congressional justifica-
tions meets the unique-harm test Discovery Network mandates to justify 
distinguishing between commercial speech and noncommercial speech. 
First, Congress relies on statistics that indicate that consumers complain 
more frequently about commercial telemarketing than charitable-
solicitation calls.112 Even if consumers complain more frequently about 
commercial telemarketing calls, Congress cannot single out commercial 
speech because some listeners consider this type of speech more offen-
sive or bothersome than other types of speech. 113 The Court has said, 
"Listeners' reactions to speech are not ... 'secondary effects.' " 114 The 
Court also rejected this line of argument in an earlier case involving the 
government's right to cut off certain commercial mailings to consumers 
111. See H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 103, at 5. 
112. See id. at 16 (relying on data from the National Association of Consumer 
Agency Administrators showing that complaints about commercial calls composed from 
80% to 99% of complaints in nine states while complaints about charitable-type calls 
made up the remainder). It should be noted that it is not clear that this survey defines 
commercial calls in the same way as Congress defines them in the TCPA. The survey 
categorizes calls as "commercial" and "charitable." Yne subheading of the Report sug-
gests that the "charitable" category includes only calls from tax-exempt organizations, 
which would mean that the "commercial" category could include consumer complaints 
about political solicitation and market-research calls. 
113. One court struck down similar state legislation for this reason. See City of 
Lysaght v. New Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646, 651-52 (D.N.J. 1993) (arguing that "the Su-
preme Court rejected the government's reliance on its interest in protecting the public 
from 'offensive' speech, and specifically declined 'to recognize a distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial speech that would render this interest a sufficient justi-
fication for a prohibition of commercial speech' " (footnote omitted) (quoting Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1983))). 
114. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) 
(quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986)). The plural-
ity explained that consumer complaints do not constitute distinct secondary effects like 
those referred to in Renton because the very purpose of the distinct harm test is to en-
sure that regulations are not content-based, and considering consumer complaints as dis-
tinct secondary effects would allow consumers to complain and remove certain speech 
from the marketplace of ideas. Acceptable distinct secondary effects include increased 
crime, as in Renton, or a danger to federalism, as in Edge. The Court indicated that the 
distinct harm test could not be applied when the justification for the regulation "focuses 
only on the content of the speech and the direct impact speech has on its listeners." 
Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. 
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based on the government's assertion that consumers found the content 
of the advertisements offensive.115 
· Second, Congress claims that consumers complain more frequently 
about commercial calls because of their greater volume and their more 
unexpected nature.116 These two theories seem to conflict: If commer-
cial calls occur in much greater numbers, they should not be so unex-
pected. Further, Congress neglects to substantiate this claim with con· 
crete numbers. 
Analyzing each statement independently shows that, even if the ra-
tionales did not conflict and were statistically supported, they would not 
support the FCC's differentiation of commercial and noncommercial re-
corded messages. Congress claims commercial solicitations result in a 
greater invasion of privacy than noncommercial solicitations because 
consumers do not expect them. This raises the question of what the in-
vasion of privacy is - the ringing of the telephone or having to listen 
to the message. Privacy is a nebulous concept, but the legislative his-
tory of the bill indicates that the invasion of privacy occurs when the 
telephone rings. Comments by the congressmen sponsoring the bill indi-
cate that the ringing of the telephone, not the nature of the call, makes 
the telephone an "insistent master." 117 Many commentators agree that 
all telephone solicitations similarly invade a home dweller's privacy.118 
A federal court evaluating the TCPA said, "[b]oth [commercial and 
nonprofit] telemarketing calls trigger the same ring of the telephone; 
115. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72. Courts express particular sympathy to free speech 
rights in cases involving the mail because of the small burden placed on the consumer 
seeking to avoid the offensive speech. Walking from the mailbox to the garbage can "is 
an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned." Lamont v. 
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 386 F.2d 449 
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968). Similarly, hanging up the telephone is 
a small burden. 
116. See H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 103, at 16 (stating that "[t]he two main 
sources of consumer problems - high volume of solicitations and unexpected solicita-
tions - are not present in solicitations by nonprofit organizations"). 
117. See 136 CONG. REc. H5820 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep. 
Markey) ("The telephone is an insistent master - when it rings we answer it." (speak-
ing in support of H.R. 2921, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), which proposed an opt-off 
mechanism for unsolicited telephone advertisements)). A state court evaluating legisla-
tion similar to the TCPA found that "[t]he necessity for protecting residential privacy is 
driven not so much by offensiveness of the content of the message as by the coupling of 
commercial telephone solicitation with a startlingly efficient and indiscriminate medium 
of distribution." State v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 882, 888 (Minn. 1992), 
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1006 (1993); see also supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
The court relied on congressional comments about the TCPA in making this judgment 
that the ringing of the telephone rather than the content of the messages disturbed re-
sidents. See 491 N.W.2d at 888 n.4. 
118. See, e.g., Albert, supra note l, at 88; Radner, supra note 16, at 380. 
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both kinds of calls invade the home equally, and both risk interrupting 
the resident's privacy equally." 119 When the telephone rings and the 
called party picks up the phone, an interruption in privacy occurs re-
gardless of who speaks on the other end of the call. The invasion in pri-
vacy that consumers complain of stems from the nature of the medium 
rather than the nature of the message.120 The invasion of privacy occurs 
before the consumer knows who is on the phone. The unexpected na-
ture of the caller has nothing to do with the invasion of privacy Con-
gress wanted to address. 
Congress also claims that commercial calls uniquely proliferateP1 
If statistics supported this, it would be the government's strongest argu-
ment for upholding the statute under the Discovery Network unique-
harm test because the government could claim proliferation constitutes 
a unique harm.122 The government could make a macroprivacy argu-
ment that limiting the calls most likely to proliferate increases the total 
level of privacy.123 Ultimately, this argument fails the Central Hudson 
test because each individual phone call causes the same invasion of pri-
vacy. The harm caused by the individual commercial message remains 
indistinguishable from the harm caused by the noncommercial message. 
Commercial calls may invade fl consumer's privacy more frequently, 
but the frequency of invasion does not change the nature of the inva-
sion. Each phone call, whether commercial or noncommercial, similarly 
interrupts residents.124 
119. Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360, 366 (D. Or. 1993), revd., 46 F.3d 970 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 2615 (1995). The only state court to consider a state law 
similar to the TCPA specifically recognized that the nature of the telephone itself makes 
such messages intrusive. See Casino, 491 N.W.2d at 888 ("The telephone is unique in 
its capacity to bring those outside the home into the home for direct verbal interchange 
- in short, the residential telephone is uniquely intrusive. . • . [T)he shrill and imperi-
ous ring of the telephone demands immediate attention."). 
120. In the early 1980s, when considering similar regulations, the FCC itself said 
all autodialer-recorded-message solicitations involve similar invasions of privacy. See In 
re Unsolicited Tel. Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1035 (1980) (stating that the "[a]ll solicita-
tion calling - whether for charitable, political or business purposes - involves similar 
privacy implications"). 
121. See supra note 116. 
122. The government also could make a successful harmful effects claim if it 
could show that commercial recorded messages cause unique fraud problems that could 
not be attributed to noncommercial messages. 
123. The Supreme Court of Minnesota accepted this justification in upholding a 
Minnesota statute requiring that a live operator introduce all recorded commercial 
messages. See State v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 882, 889 (Minn. 1992), 
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1006 (1993). The court decided the case before Discovery 
Network, however. 
124. Assuming commercial recorded messages call residential subscribers more 
frequently than noncommercial recorded messages, this situation reverses the facts of 
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Finally, Congress alleges that the invasion of privacy caused by a 
phone call with a commercial message differs qualitatively from the in-
vasion of privacy caused by a call with a noncommercial message, as 
indicated by the greater number of consumer complaints about commer-
cial calls. In making this argument, Congress presumes the content of 
commercial speech is inherently less valuable than other kinds of 
speech, a presumption that is impermissible. Congress cannot show that 
commercial recorded messages invade consumers' privacy more than 
noncommercial recorded messages. In fact, the congressional findings 
preceding the TCPA show exactly the opposite. Congress states that 
"residential telephone subscribers consider automated or prerecorded 
telephone calls, regardless of the content or the initiator of the message, 
to be a nuisance and an invasion of privacy." 125 The original Senate bill 
outlawed all unsolicited recorded messages.126 
The privacy justifications Congress provided for restricting com-
mercial solicitations thus apply equally to noncommercial solicitations. 
Discovery Network precludes the FCC from singling out commercial 
speech for regulation simply because it believes that commercial speech 
deserves less protection.127 Under the reconstituted Central Hudson test, 
Congress cannot discriminate among speakers and address the privacy 
problem in a piecemeal fashion that impacts only certain solicitors with-
out a showing that consumers suffer unique harms from these messages. 
2. The FCC Regulations and the Means-Ends Fit 
This section argues that even if Congress enacted the TCPA with 
the permissible objective of preventing the intrusion caused by all types 
of recorded messages, the FCC regulations violate the Central Hudson 
requirement that the means fit the ends. 128 The Court describes this test 
Discovery Network. In Discovery Network, commercial newsracks accounted for only a 
small part of the safety and aesthetic problems plaguing the city. Here, commercial re-
corded messages would account for a greater percentage of the problem. The Discovery 
Network analysis still should apply, however, because each phone call invades privacy, 
not just the proliferation of calls. "[T]he city's primary concern, as argued to us, is with 
aggregate number of newsracks on its streets. On that score, however, all newsracks, re-
gardless of whether they contain commercial or noncommercial publications, are 
equally at fault" City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 
(1993). 
125. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243 § 2(10), 
105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 note (Supp. V. 1993)) (emphasis 
added). 
126. See S. 1462, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. REP. No. 178, supra note 4, at 
3-4, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1970-71. 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62. 
128. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1591 (1995). 
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as something less than a least-restrictive-means test but something more 
than a rational-basis test.129 The regulation should not "burden substan-
tially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legiti-
mate interests." 130 
The regulations implementing the no-recorded-message provision 
operate in a highly restrictive fashion because they virtually ban one 
means of communication: the recorded message. The provision autho-
rizes an opt-on mechanism that requires prior approval from consum-
ers.131 Telephone solicitors using recorded messages can contact only 
those consumers who give "prior express invitation or permission." 132 
This opt-on mechanism places the burden on consumers who must con-
tact every solicitor they wish to receive messages from and creates a 
presumption against the use of recorded messages. The Court rejected 
prior-approval statutes in a similar situation in which the Post Office 
proposed that a drug company sending controversial advertisements ob-
tain the prior consent of all households receiving the advertisements.133 
The Court found that the prior-approval statute imposed too large a bur-
den on householders.134 The opt-on requirement of the FCC regulations 
implementing the TCPA similarly places too great a burden on 
consumers. 
The opt-on mechanism also violates the intermediate-scrutiny test 
by disregarding less burdensome means of protecting consumers' pri-
vacy. To evaluate the fit between the ends and the means, the Court 
often relies on cases expounding the narrowly drawn requirement of 
129. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (describing the test 
as requiring a "fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not nec-
essarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest 
served" (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982))). 
130. 492 U.S. at 478 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 
(1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (interpreting the narrow tailoring requirement 
of time, place, and manner restrictions)). 
131. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(5) (1995). In another case involving an opt-on 
mechanism for recipients of unsealed mail containing a communist political message, 
the Court said that an opt-on mechanism was "almost certain to have a deterrent effect" 
on the information received by postal patrons. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 
301, 307 (1965). "[l]nhibition as well as prohibition against the exercise of precious 
First Amendment rights is a power denied to government." 381 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, 
J., concurring). 
132. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(c)(2), (f)(5) (1995). 
133. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
134. See 463 U.S. at 80 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that 
"First Amendment freedoms would be of little value if speakers had to obtain permis-
sion of their audiences before advancing particular viewpoints. . . . Although this re-
striction [the prior-approval requirement] directly advances weighty governmental inter-
ests, it is somewhat more extensive than is necessary to serve those interests"). 
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time, place, and manner restrictions.135 The Court explained this stan-
dard in a frequently cited passage: "The requirement of narrow tailor-
ing ·is satisfied 'so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial 
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the 
regulation.' " 136 Even under this standard, however, legislators cannot 
draw substantially excessive regulations, disregarding "far less restric-
tive and more precise means.'' 137 The FCC no-recorded-message regula-
tions fall into the substantially excessive category because they presume 
that all residents object to receiving telemarketing calls despite the fact 
that it is possible to identify those residents who actually object.138 The 
Court has recognized that a ban on speech to protect privacy may be 
too restrictive when the legislature can identify the specific individuals 
who object.139 By regulating the medium, the current no-recorded-mes-
sage regulations restrict the flow of information to all consumers. 
Although the reasonable-fit factor does not require that legislators 
adopt the least-restrictive alternative, the Court demands that the legis-
lative body choose a reasonable alternative.140 A White House spokes-
person in the Bush administration admitted that, prior to the signing of 
the TCPA, the administration had not been shown that less-drastic ad-
ministrative remedies would be insufficient to protect residential pri-
vacy.141 In 1980, the FCC itself said that "a complete ban on unsolicited 
calls or a prohibition on such calls to subscribers who have not affinna-
135. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
136. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quoting United 
States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). The Court decided this case before 1993, 
so it is not clear that the language still describes the reasonable-fit requirement. In 
Edenfield, the Court determined that a time, place, and manner restriction is reasonable 
only where a restriction on speech shares a "close and substantial relation" with the 
government interest asserted. See Edenfield v. Fane, 501 U.S. 701, 773 (1993). 
137. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479 (1989) (quoting Shapero v. 
Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
138. Several states have adopted legislation that enables solicitors to identify those 
consumers who object to their calls. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. Ch. 501.059(3) (1995) (pro-
viding that consumers who do not want to receive solicitation calls can identify them-
selves in the Jocal phone book); OR. REY. STAT.§ 646.569 (1995) (same). 
139. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 530, 542 n.11 
(1980) (citing Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970)). 
140. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 
(1993) (stating that "if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to 
the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in deter-
mining whether the 'fit' between ends and means is reasonable"); see also text accom-
panying notes 74-77. 
141. See House Considers Restriction on Advertising by Telephone and Fax, N.Y. 
TIMEs, July 31, 1990, at A13. 
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tively indicated a desire to receive them would probably be 
unlawful." 142 
The FCC regulations implementing the no-recorded-message pro-
vision of the TCPA fail the Central Hudson test because they do not 
meet the reasonable-relationship test. The regulations cannot be justified 
as an attempt to single out commercial speech to deal with a unique 
commercial hann. Further, by creating a presumption against the use of 
one medium of communication - the recorded message·- the regula-
tions take an unnecessarily drastic step. 
CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the regulations implementing the no-recorded-mes-
sage provision of the TCPA, which prohibits telemarketers from con-
veying unsolicited advertisements via recorded messages without· the 
prior express consent of the called party, demonstrates the subtleties of 
modern commercial speech jurisprudence. After the 1993 Supreme 
Court commercial speech cases, a valid commercial speech regulation 
must directly advance a substantial governmental interest, address 
unique harms attributable only to the regulated speech, and survive an 
intermediate-scrutiny means-ends test. The no-recorded-message provi-
sion unconstitutionally distinguishes between commercial speech and 
noncommercial speech because the regulation fails to respond to a 
unique commercial harm, and the means do not fit the ends. 
Although the FCC cannot address the invasion of privacy that un-
expected phone calls cause by singling out commercial messages, the 
FCC could adopt a mechanism that would permit residents to contact a 
central clearinghouse and opt off all unsolicited, nonpersonal calls re-
gardless of whether the calls were commercial or noncommercial. An 
opt-off mechanism would survive constitutional scrutiny under the time, 
place, and manner test, which tolerates regulations that balance the con-
flicting liberty interests of speakers and listeners as long as they are 
content-neutral, narrowly drawn, serve a significant governmental inter-
est, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.143 
An opt-off mechanism would permit residents to block out a larger 
sector of speech than the current ban applicable only to commercial so-
licitations. It first appears strange that a more widely applicable mecha-
142. In re Unsolicited Tel. Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1035 (1980). 
143. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark 
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
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nism passes constitutional muster when a narrower provision fails. 144 
But as this Note has demonstrated, the narrower ban impermissibly dif-
ferentiates speech based on its content. The Court has expressed partic-
ular concern about provisions that restrict speech in this manner. An 
opt-off mechanism, by contrast, functions in a less-restrictive manner 
than a mandatory ban. It presumes that consumers prefer to receive in-
formation and places the burden of action on them if they want to avoid 
certain kinds of speech. The pro-communication posture inherent in an 
opt-off mechanism more accurately reflects the values underlying the 
First Amendment, which creates a presumption in favor of free speech, 
than the current opt-on mechanism. 
144. It is even possible to argue that Congress could do something more drastic by 
outlawing all recorded messages, regardless of content. The Eighth Circuit recently up-
held a Minnesota statute that outlaws all recorded messages regardless of content. See 
Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1546 (8th Cir. 1995). The court determined 
that the statute was content-neutral and evaluated it under the time, place, and manner 
test. The court upheld that statute because it determined that the statute was narrowly 
tailored and left open ample alternative channels for communication. See 59 F.3d at 
1555-56; see also Bland v. Fessler, 79 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding a statute 
held narrowly tailored and largely content neutral); TRIBE, supra note 15, § 12-3, at 800 
(arguing that the concept of equality among views "may sometimes result, perhaps 
ironically, in the reduced protection of speech, since one method of 'equalizing' is not 
to permit more speech but rather to adopt even more suppressive content-neutral regula-
tions" (citing Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 189, 205 (1983))). 
